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Abstract
The Affordable Care Act created the national insurance exchanges of qualified health plans
(QHP) to encourage a higher insured rate, larger risk pools, and lower prices for quality health
coverage (Aaron et al., 2017). Consolidation of insurers can have opposing effects. The insurers’
risk pools will grow, allowing insurers to better hedge for risk. However, consolidation decreases
the prevalence of competition in the market, and past research shows that insurer consolidation
decreases market competition and increases prices (Dafny, 2015).
This study examines how the number of plans offered and firms in a set market, plan pricing
components, and country health variables impact monthly premium pricing for plans sold on the
individual market. This study also analyzes how effective the exchanges are at keeping insurance
prices low. Using an ordinary least squares regression technique, I model the premium prices of
individual insurance plans sold on the QHP Landscape SHOP Medical Market through
Healthcare.gov with controls for county health variables and other insurance plan pricing
components. This method helps show the relationship between premium price and the number of
plans sold from 2014 to 2017. The study’s findings show that the top three influential variables
on premium price are the presence of a maximum out of pocket, the rate of excess drinking, and
the unemployment rate. I also conclude that more plans in a market are associated with lower
premium prices.
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1. Introduction
In 2017, approximately 35,000 of the United States citizens who sought individual health
insurance from the Obamacare exchanges were uncertain if their counties would have a plan
listed to purchase for 2018 (Park & Carlsen, 2017). There were 45 counties at risk of having zero
plans listed on the exchange, making these counties potential “bare counties” (Park & Carlen,
2017). Furthermore, nearly three million people in 1,388 counties may have had only one insurer
from which to choose from for 2018 as identified in Figure 1.1 below. Currently, about 45% of
U.S. counties are at risk of being a bare county unless another insurance provider steps into those
markets. This could greatly impact nearly twelve million Americans who buy their own coverage
on the individual market. At the opposite end of the spectrum, 57% of individual market
enrollees had a choice of three or more insurers in 2016, compared to the 22% with a choice
between two and the 21% with only a single insurance carrier option (Frank & McGuire, 2017).
The number of counties with only one insurer has doubled since 2014, and the number of
counties with three or more insurers has significantly fallen.
Figure 1.1 Number of Insurers in Each U.S. County for the 2018 Enrollment Period, 2017
______________________________________________________________________________

_____________________________________________________________________________
Note: Park & Carlsen, 2017. Originally from KFF, 2017. This map only includes plans on the the Obamacare
marketplace.

Most individuals who buy from the ACA exchange receive the insurance subsidies meant to
offset premium prices. Recent analysis shows that insurers are choosing to exit the ACA
marketplace to sell exclusively in markets where customers are ineligible to use government
subsidies (Abelson & Park, 2017). In February 2017, Humana announced it would pull out of the
Obamacare markets (Luhby, 2017). Three months later, Blue Cross Blue Shield (BCBS)
announced that it would enter the Knoxville, TN market that would have otherwise been left void
of coverage since Humana had been the coverage region’s sole insurance provider. The President
and CEO of BlueCross BlueShield of Tennessee J.D. Hickey said that getting and keeping
Tennesseans covered had been “challenging” with the three prior years seeing volatility and
losses greater than $400 million (Trexler, 2017). Despite great losses in the overall Tennessee
market, Hickey cited that their performance in 2017 was stabilizing, setting them up to enter
Rating Area 2, the Knoxville market. In June 2017, Anthem announced that it would be pulling
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from the Ohio market by 2018, leaving 18 counties “bare,” or without an insurance provider
(Abelson & Park, 2017).
Research has shown that markets with fewer insurers have seen larger increases in price
(Holahan et al., 2017). However, this research does not address the price effects in markets with
fewer plans. As of 2015, the private insurance premium for the average family was almost
$17,000 with out-of-pocket spending reaching $800 per person (Dafny, 2015). Consolidation of
insurers has also lent itself to a decrease in the number of insurers. Health insurers have been
consolidating since the 1990s with over 400 mergers since 1996 (Frank & McGuire, 2017).
Between 2011 and 2015, the amount of healthcare consolidation doubled (Barker 2017).
Meanwhile, national healthcare expenditures have increased nearly 45% in the last thirty years
(Barker 2017). Healthcare spending has grown to almost 20% of US GDP, currently double the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) per capita average (Einav &
Levin, 2015). With significant price changes and decreases in the number of providers per
county, this raises concern for the prices of the American consumer. The U.S. government tried
to make the health insurance markets more competitive, but health insurance companies may
have too much market power.
In the following paper, I review the policy background of the health insurance market in the
United States. Then, I discuss the past literature about health insurance, competition, pricing, and
the interaction of the three. I then explain my data sources and methods, followed by the
empirics and visualization of my findings. This research addresses the impact that changes in the
number of plans per county has on the price of insurance plans sold on the ACA Individual
Marketplace. I explore the effect on monthly premium prices as the number of silver plans
offered per county and the number of firms offering silver plans changes. I look specifically at
silver plans because they are the most common plan metal level, for the age group 40-49 and for
the family size of a couple with 2 children (KFF, 2016b). My research shows that in a model
looking at the number of plans, as the number of plans increases, the premium price decreases. In
a model looking at the number of firms, as the number of firms increases, the premium price
decreases. Lastly, in a model looking at the number of plans and firms holding the number of
plans constant, as the number of firms increases, the premium price increases.
2. Background
The longevity of the individual market is a critical policy issue. The United States is seeing a rise
in the cost of healthcare, bringing into question the affordability of the health insurance system
(Barket, 2017). The individual market is inherently a coverage tool for non-traditional or more
vulnerable populations (Court, 2016). The complexity of the ACA and the uncertainty
surrounding repeal-and-replace legislation have notable consequences for both insurance
companies and payers into the individual market (Aaron, 2017). Despite this complexity and
continued debate, the ACA did lead to a successful expansion of coverage (Court, 2016).
However, this expansion did initially come at a cost to insurers, who faced increased regulation,
unstable exchange participation, and original prices set too low to cover costs. Currently, the
destabilization of ACA is causing more uncertainty while premium prices are still going up,
making the success of the individual market in the long-term unclear.
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The rise in healthcare expenditures in a consolidating marketplace has unveiled a key policy
issue: whether or not health insurance markets have a sufficient number of plans and/or firms for
competitive forces to work. It is the role of the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade
Commission to determine the intensity of concentration when evaluating firm consolidation.
National healthcare expenditures as a percentage of GDP have increased 44% since 1990, from
12.5% to 18%, although this growth has rendered off since 2010 (Barker, 2017). In the
healthcare business model, consolidation has become a key factor. Since 2009, consolidation
activity, such as mergers, acquisitions, joint ventures, and affiliation, has continued to increase,
and fewer companies control more of the market share, as seen in Figure 2.1 below. Between
2011 and 2015, that activity doubled (Barker, 2017). There is great debate surrounding the
impact of this activity on healthcare delivery and cost reduction, as mergers and acquisitions
reduce competition.
Figure 2.1 Estimated National Market Shares of the Four Largest Insurers, 2006-2014
______________________________________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________________________
Note: Dafny, 2015. In eight years, the four-firm concentration ratio of private insurers rose percentage points.
Between 2006 and 2014, the ratio increased from 74% to 84%. For comparison, this ratio for the airline industry in
62%.

The individual market is an integral component of healthcare markets, but it is also polarizing.
Policymakers debate the functionality of the individual market due to the high administrative
costs, ineffectual state regulations, and high degrees of market concentration (Abraham et al.,
2014). The individual market is a place to buy health insurance for people who may be
self-employed, lower-wage or part-time workers, early retirees, or people who simply lost
coverage through life events like job loss or divorce (Court, 2016). Since the ACA, the
individual market is built into regulated state insurance exchanges, which heavily rely on
regulations to ensure that plans offer baseline benefits, consumers have the power to choose, and
risk selection is limited (Einav & Levin, 2015).
Political actions have significant impacts on the functionality of the individual market. In May
2017, the House of Representatives passed the American Health Care Act, which repealed the
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individual mandate retroactive to the 2016 plan year. The Congressional Budget Office estimated
that many healthier enrollees would exit the market with no individual mandate, driving a 20%
increase in market premiums for 2018 (Aaron, 2017). The individual mandate elimination could
lead to a “death spiral” of rising premiums and an exodus of healthy, young payers from the
market (Court, 2016). Additionally, discussion concerning cost-sharing reimbursement payments
to insurers is still uncertain. The Kaiser Family Foundation estimated that without the
reimbursements, the premiums for silver plans could increase as much as 19% on average
(Aaron, 2017). National subsidization was a tool to encourage healthier, lower-risk, and
lower-income individuals to enter the marketplace, and without their participation, the risk pool
could become full of higher risk individuals paying even higher premiums.
The ACA created a system of subsidization to improve the affordability of health insurance and
required people to pay for a health plan on their own or with subsidies or else pay a fee under the
individual mandate. Despite its imperfections, the ACA’s individual market successfully
expanded coverage through reforms that banned insurers from denying coverage or price
gouging due to preexisting conditions (Aaron, 2017). In 2013, the policy provisions led to an
additional 6 million enrollments in the individual market, from 11 million in 2013 to 17 million
in 2017. Between 2013 and 2014, the individual market enrollment size increased by nearly 50%
(Court, 2016). Three out of five people who were able to access coverage through ACA policy
reforms said that they would not have been able to afford or access health care before (Court,
2016). As of 2018, 11.8 million Americans enrolled in the exchanges, as compared to 12.2
million in 2017 (Cauchi, 2018).
However, health insurers began to announce losses, which they attributed to regulation and their
exchange participation. Under the ACA’s minimum medical loss ratio (MLR) regulation,
insurers in the individual market are required to spend at least 80% of premium dollars on claims
and payer care after taxes, licensing, and regulatory fees under the (Abraham et al., 2014). The
Affordable Care Act introduced a new level of scrutiny to insurance rate hikes through Effective
Rate Reviews (ERR), ensuring that large increases be analyzed to check that the increases are
based on reasonable assumptions and evidence with the intention to provide payers with great
value for their dollar (CMS). The Department of Health and Human Services assists states in
reviewing plans with proposed increases greater than 10% in the individual market and conducts
the review process or provides grants if the states lack the resources to conduct the review on
their own. As seen in Table 2.1, the rate increases that are greater than 10% are numerous.
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Table 2.1 Average Silver and Average Second Lowest Cost Silver Plan Premiums, 2017-2018
______________________________________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________________________
Note: Cauchi, 2018. Originally from Avalere Health, LLC, 2017. The states with an asterisk are instances where the
second lowest cost silver plan is costlier than the average silver plan, stemming from the limited number of plans.
Often the second lowest cost plan is also the highest cost in that region.

Insurer losses cannot be entirely attributed to one lone factor. Originally, the insurers selling on
the exchanges set premiums too low to cover the claims of the new enrollees, which generated
significant losses for the companies from 2014 through 2016. These losses led some insurers to
exit the exchanges, which left 1 out of 5 enrollees with only one company offering coverage in
their market. However, some of this exit is due to the natural adjustment patterns that new
markets undergo, with poorly-performing sellers exiting the marketplace and successful sellers
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expanding (Aaron, 2017). The insurance providers that remained on the exchanges in 2017
raised premiums 22% on average for the benchmark plan.
The destabilization that characterized ACA policies in 2017 occurred despite insurers doing
better financially throughout the year. In July of that year, the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services announced that only 141 insurers applied to participate on the exchanges for
2018, which had fallen from 227 applicants the year prior (Cauchi, 2018). In August 2017, the
HHS announced a 90% cut in health enrollment program funding, in addition to the cuts to
navigator nonprofit organizations that help people enroll in the marketplaces (Cauchi, 2018).
Leading up to the open enrollment period for 2018, the ACA faced shorter timeframes, federal
budget cuts, and public confusion surrounding the repeal-and-replace debates (Cauchi, 2018).
3. Literature Review
The insurance market may be classified as a monopolistic competitive market. In this case, the
suppliers (ie., insurers) differ primarily on location and the plan quality provided (Busso &
Galiani, 2015). Firms with market power may use that position to maximize profits and may do
so by reducing quality and/or raise prices (Tirole, 1988). In contrast, increased competition in a
market puts downward pressure on price, incentivizing organizational efficiencies, or puts
upward pressure on quality (Nickell, 1996). The first experiment on the effect of increased
competition on prices and quality of goods showed that six months after randomly opening 61
retail firms into the Dominican Republic market, product prices in the treated areas had fallen by
6%, although quality did not (Busso & Galiani, 2015). In the insurance market, a comprehensive
review shows that markets with more insurers have lower premiums (Frank & McGuire, 2017).
This is informative in that it suggests that policymakers should pay attention to the supply
conditions because the majority of policy targets the supply side. However, insurers may not end
up with the right incentives to engage in competition as insurance markets tend to be highly
concentrated and consumers must be informed and price-sensitive which is not observed in
actuality (Einav & Levin, 2015). Therefore, it is highly important to carefully make market
design decisions.
Recent studies have shown that there is much variation across geographic areas in the US when it
comes to the number of insurers conducting business in a market, the number of offered plans,
and the distribution of premium costs (Dickstein et al., 2015). One would expect larger market
sizes in terms of quantity demanded to be associated with increases in the number of firms in
those markets (Brenshan and Reiss, 1991). This could lead to a bundling of smaller markets with
larger ones, which could improve the amount of choice and lower premiums. However, too large
of coverage regions could create too heterogeneous of insurance pools, which may inefficiently
mitigate risk (Dickstein et al., 2015). The findings show that after controlling for the county’s
population, the number of health insurers increases and premiums decreases when small counties
are bundled with a more populous county, although the effect varies when grouped coverage
areas are heterogeneous (Dickstein et al., 2015). When grouping counties together, adding a
dissimilar county may force additional costs onto the rest of the counties in the region.
Research has documented that consolidation of private health insurers leads to premium
increases (Dafny, 2015). This effect occurs despite the increased market share allowing the
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insurers to get lower prices from health care providers, which decreases the insurer’s marginal
costs. Dafny noted that there is limited evidence on the impact of consolidation on quality. In a
study on the price effects of the merger of UnitedHealth-Sierra Health Services in 2008,
researchers found that premiums in the Nevada markets increased over 13% more than the
control group post-merger, suggesting that UnitedHealth-Sierra took advantage of the increased
market power (Guardado et al., 2013). Dafny categorizes this consolidation as attempts for
regional insurers to broaden their service areas, for national insurers to broaden their geographic
reach, for incumbents to acquire local HMOs and provider plans, and for Anthem to consolidate
for-profit BlueCross BlueShield. This consolidation creates a monopsony effect in that the large
insurers drive prices down from the providers. Additionally, mergers not only lead to premium
increases for the merger parties but also for the rival insurers in areas where the merging firms
significantly overlapped, so insurers did not pass cost savings to the consumers (Dafny, 2015).
Growing concentration in the healthcare sector is symptomatic of the decreasing availability of
community hospitals and the evolution of insurance products (Glied & Altman, 2017). To what
extent consolidation in health plans benefits consumer has also been studied in depth. In the past,
consolidation has not necessarily resulted in lower prices for consumers. According to Harry
Kraemer, a clinical professor of strategy at Northwestern University's Kellogg School of
Management, consolidation will benefit the consumer under two conditions: if the consolidation
gets the benefits of efficiency and economies of scale and if it doesn’t reduce competition to the
point where the resulting company denies the customer receiving as good of a price as before the
merger or acquisition (Barker, 2017).
Researchers have also documented the high degree of concentration that exists in the individual
market (AMA, 2017), while also noting the connection to market power. The American Medical
Association found that 69% of 389 metropolitan statistical areas (MSA) studied were highly
concentrated. That same study found that in 43% of those MSAs, one insurer has 50% of the
market share. Further research looked at the antitrust impact of the potential Aetna-Humana
merger (AMA, 2016a). The results of that study showed that the merger would likely enhance
their market power in Georgia and Kentucky’s commercial combined markets and warrant
scrutiny in Utah, Texas, Florida, and Kansas. The AMA also looked at the antitrust impact of the
potential Anthem-Cigna merger and found that the merger would enhance their market power in
10 of the 14 states that Anthem is licensed to cover. In the other four states, their market share
would warrant additional scrutiny (2016b). Concentration is slightly lower in urban markets, but
that is relative because it is highly concentrated everywhere (Frakt, Pizer, & Feldman, 2012).
Because there is less concentration at the national level, researchers suggest that fixed costs are
at the regional level instead (Einav & Levin, 2015). However, exchanges reduce the fixed costs
of marketing a carrier’s products to consumers, thus reducing barriers to entry (Ginsburg, 2016).
Because the exchanges make it simpler for consumers to gain the information needed to make
decisions, they help make the individual market more competitive (Ginsburg, 2016).
The ACA exchanges rely on the participation of insurance carriers, with the intention of those
carriers engaging in dynamic market competition (Cantor & Monheit, 2016) to lower premiums.
Premium increases from consolidation generally have not been offset from new insurers entering
the market. There are several barriers to entry that new firms face, which include, building
provider networks, negotiating reimbursement rates, establishing a good reputation, meeting with
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brokers, and achieving economies of scale (Dafny, 2015). An HHS analysis showed that an
increase in the number of carriers offering coverage in a local rating area lowered premiums of
the second-lowest cost silver plan by 4% in the first year of the exchanges (Frank & McGuire,
2017). An average of 4 insurance companies participated in each rating areas for the states using
the federal insurance exchange, and researchers found that, had all the insurers who sold
individual market insurance prior to the ACA participated in the marketplace, premiums would
have been 11% lower (Dafny et al., 2014). In counties with three or more issuers in 2015,
benchmark premiums were more than 9% lower than in counties with only one or two insurance
carriers participating in the exchange (Sheingold et al., 2015). That same study found that
counties with a net gain in insurers had an adjusted premium growth rate 8.4% lower than
counties with no net growth or net losses.
The individual market encapsulates the negative relationship between MLRs and payer volume,
in addition to the negative relationship between an insurer’s MLR and its preexisting market
power. In the individual market, insurers that have more payers in their other market segments
have lower MLRs on average. Research shows that there is some evidence that these larger
insurers with low MLRs may also have increased market power due to their size (Abraham et al.,
2014). To explore how insurers responded to the MLR regulation, one study examined how
insurers adjusted the component parts of the MLR calculation (Abraham et al., 2014). The 2014
study found that the 2011 administrative costs were lower than in 2010, which increased MLRs
in the individual market. Although insurers can increase their MLR by reducing premiums, the
researchers’ could not provide evidence that insurers acted in this way (Abraham et al., 2014).
Further analysis showed that MLR changes were caused by increases in medical claims, not
through decreases in premiums. However, consumers shopping on the insurance exchanges do
respond to premium differences (Frank & McGuire, 2017). In 2016, over 40% of renewing
payers switched marketplace plans, and most of the switches occurred in the same metal tier.
This suggests that marketplace consumers shop based on price, not coverage. Achieving and
maintaining coverage in the individual market that is affordable and accessible without an
individual mandate is a structural challenge, in that there is a constant threat of adverse risk
selection (Cantor & Monheit, 2016). The individual market is often considered a “bridge”
market, with a large portion of enrollees using the coverage for a short time period to fill
coverage gaps caused by changes in jobs, marital status, early retirement, or aging off a parent’s
plan (Ziller et al., 2004). The limited demand for individual market plan raises concerns that the
market may not be effective at pooling risk, although proponents argue that this market
encourages competition and reduces job lock (Cantor & Monheit, 2016). The individual market
by default is more likely to appeal to individuals with higher expected medical expenses.
The ACA banned denying coverage and price gouging for consumers with preexisting conditions
which creates heterogeneous risk pools. Insurers are less able to set premiums that reflect a
payer’s true health risk, leading to people who are high risk paying the same premium as payers
who are low risk (Cantor & Monheit, 2016). Without the ability to charge premiums based on
health risk, payers make coverage choices that do not reflect their respective risk. When the risk
pools are not separated, the pool is heterogeneous, and the premium for that pool will rise over
time due to the high-risk payers making significantly more costly claims (Cantor & Monheit,
2016). This in effect leads to the exodus of low-risk enrollees to change plans or exit the market
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altogether. Repeating cycles of premium increases and low-risk payer withdrawal may result in
the adverse selection “death spiral” that is unsustainable in the long run if not regulated (Cantor
& Monheit, 2016). The individual mandate addresses adverse selection or a disproportionate
enrollment of poor health payers opting into a market with open enrollment and no exclusions.
Without the individual mandate, adverse selection may lead to the “death spiral” of increasing
premiums and impacting market stability but more drastically than previously expected (Eibner
& Saltzman, 2015). The textbook solution to adverse selection is to charge high-risk payers
higher premiums. However, this may be seen as immoral, and this is regressive since higher
income is associated better health, so risk pricing may mean higher premiums for lower-income
payers (Einav and Levin, 2015).
Insurers may not have the right incentives to engage in competition that is known to put
downward pressure on price (Nickell, 1996). Additionally, there is some variation in geography
for the number of insurers and plans in each market (Dickstein et al., 2015). Therefore, I build
upon past research to look at how the variation in both the number of plans and firms affects the
price of premiums, after accounting for other plan pricing factors in addition
geographically-varied health and socioeconomic factors.
4. Data
The original data for this study comes from the healthcare.gov website, which compiles plan
information from the QHP Landscape Individual Medical Market. This is panel data with the
unit of analysis being the plan ID each year from 2014 to 2017. Therefore, for each plan ID and
year combination, there is also information on the pricing and location of the plan. The data
include all states that participate in the federal marketplace except for the state of Virginia, due
to its structure of counties and independent cities. I collected the following variables from the
data set for every plan ID categorized as a silver plan by state, county, rating area, and year:
issuer, plan type, monthly premium for a couple aged 40-49 with two children, medical
deductible, prescription deductible, maximum out-of-pocket for medical costs, standard costs
associated with primary care physician visits, specialist visits, emergency room visits, generic
prescriptions and preferred brand prescriptions. There are 111,932 plans in 1,574 counties in 408
rating areas throughout 35 states.
For all of the standard cost variables, I separated all the costs into copayment amounts and
coinsurance percentages. Data that was presented as a decimal or with a percentage symbol was
assumed to be a coinsurance rate. Data that was presented as a whole number with no symbol or
with a dollar sign was assumed to be a copayment amount. In Table, 4.1 below, a summary
shows that there were 111,932 plans in the data set, though many plans were counted twice if
they spanned different counties.
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Table 4.1 Summary Statistics of QHP Landscape Individual Medical Market Data
Variable

Obs

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Year

111,932

2015.4760

1.0406

2014

2017

FIPS Code

111,932

31759.770

14970.2100

1001

56045

Plan Type

111,932

2.8258

1.0940

1

4

Premium for a Couple
with Two Children

111,932

1028.6030

235.2209

489

2844

Standard Medical
Deductible for Family
Coverage

111,932

4990.4400

3535.0970

0

13700

Standard Drug Deductible 111,932
for Family Coverage

131.0800

466.6082

0

7000

Maximum Medical Out
of Pocket

111,932

5808.4880

5936.5480

0

13200

Maximum Drug Out of
Pocket

111,932

10.2133

175.6451

0

4800

Standard Coinsurance for
Primary Care Physician

111,932

0.0567

0.1159

0

0.5

Standard Copayment for
Primary Care Physician

111,932

21.9179

16.8300

0

125

Standard Coinsurance for
Specialist

111,932

0.0686

0.1256

0

0.5

Standard Copayment for
Specialist

111,932

37.6663

30.5313

0

180

Standard Copayment for
ER

111,932

222.2335

213.7491

0

1000

Standard Coinsurance for
ER

111,932

0.1376

0.1415

0

0.5

Copayment for Generic
Drugs

111,932

9.0410

7.4101

0

40
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Coinsurance for Generic
Drugs

111,932

0.0356

0.1067

0

0.5

Coinsurance for Preferred 111,932
Brand Drugs

0.0606

0.1341

0

0.5

Copayment for Preferred
Brand Drugs

111,932

34.9329

22.3815

0

120

No Medical Maximum
Out of Pocket

111,932

0.4986

0.5000

0

1

______________________________________________________________________________
Note: No Medical Maximum Out of Pocket was coded as 1 if there was no maximum and 0 if there was a maximum.

Further building upon the original set of data, I include demographic, socioeconomic, and health
variables to account for variability amongst the population of those purchasing silver plans from
the ACA exchanges. The following control variables originated from County Health Rankings
and Roadmaps, a program through the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation: poor or fair health,
adult smoking percentage, adult obesity percentage, excess drinking percentage, the
unemployment rate, and the violent crime rate. The control following variables originated from
the National Center for Health Statistics: expected death from cancer and expected death from
heart disease. I created the final two dependent variable, number of firms and number of plans
per county using Stata command. The summary statistics for pricing, health, and socioeconomic
variables are in Table 4.2 below.
Table 4.2 Summary Statistics of HealthCare.gov Data with Additional County-Level Data
Variable

Obs

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Year

1,574 2015.5290

1.120279

2014

2017

State & Rating Code

1,574 29239.5200

16238.6

1001

56003

Premium for a Couple with
Two Children

1,574 1065.1010

233.4612

667.6839

2805

Standard Medical
Deductible for Family
Coverage

1,574 4827.2590

3355.609

0

11466.67

Standard Drug Deductible
for Family Coverage

1,574 106.3178

209.4872

0

1892.308

Maximum Medical Out of
Pocket

1,574 5383.7810

5738.32

0

13200
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No Medical Maximum Out
of Pocket

1,574 0.5348

0.4931459

0

1

Standard Coinsurance for
Specialist

1,574 0.0603

0.055988

0

0.5

Standard Copay for
Specialist

1,574 41.1119

16.68245

0

90.90909

Coinsurance for Preferred
Brand Drugs

1,574 0.0522

0.0702993

0

0.5

Copay for Preferred Brand
Drugs

1,574 37.5855

13.30909

0

75

Plan Type

1,574 2.4903

0.9987405

1

4

Poor or Fair Health
Ranking

1,574 0.1708

0.045699

0.049636

0.358

Adult Smoking %

1,574 0.1913

0.0418934

0

0.336833

Adult Obesity %

1,574 0.3136

0.0405381

0.137

0.443

Excess Drinking %

1,574 0.1509

0.0477459

0

0.291667

Unemployment Rate

1,574 0.0703

0.021485

0.022

0.1855

Violent Crime Rate

1,574 333.8504

200.5911

33.832

1411.36

Expected Death from
Cancer (4yr lag)

1,538 223.7848

40.22412

138.8

880.1

Expected Death from Heart
Disease (4yr lag)

1,574 564.8825

426.5581

31

1569

Number of Plans per
County

1,574 14.5910

9.684738

1

57.85965

Number of Firms per
County

1,574 3.0392

1.693404

1

12

Note: For the purposes of summarization, the values in the table represent the average of all values within each
county.

5. Methods
For this analysis, I run three ordinary least squares (OLS) models. I use OLS regressions because
this method allows me to predict the values of the continuous dependent variable (premium) and
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because OLS allows me to identify the strength of the relationship of the dependent and control
variable with the premium price. I estimate the dependent variable, monthly premium for a
couple aged 40 to 49 with two children, using components of the plan’s pricing structure, the
county health variables, and the socioeconomic county variables as controls. My three models
vary the independent variable of interest. The first model includes the number of plans per
county. The second model includes the number of firms per county. The third model includes the
number of plans and firms per county. I run each regression clustering at the state rating area
level and absorbing the categorical variable for each state’s rating areas. Therefore, I am
absorbing the fixed effects that stem from a large number of dummy variables in my dataset.
Below are the three model specifications used for this study. For all three regressions, each β is
for each plan ID i, plan type j, and year t.
Model 1: The Effect of the Number of Plans per County on Premium Price
couplechild2_40ijt = β0 +
β1 meddeduct_famstdijt + β2 drugdeduct_famstdijt +
β3


medpocket_famstdijt + β4 nomaxijt + β5 spec_std_coinsijt + β6 spec_std_copayijt + β7
prefbranddrugs_std_coinsijt +
β8 prefbranddrugs_std_copay

ijt +
 β9 poor_or_fair_health
ijt +


β10 adult_smoking
ijt + β11 adult_obesity
ijt + β12 excess_drinking
ijt + β13 unemp_rate
ijt + β14




violent_crime_rateijt + β15 exp_death_cancer
ijt + β16 exp_death_heart
ijt + β17 numplan
ijt +



β18 i.ntype
it + β19 i.year
ij + εijt



Model 2: The Effect of the Number of Firms per County on Premium Price
couplechild2_40ijt = β0 +
β1 meddeduct_famstdijt + β2 drugdeduct_famstdijt +
β3


medpocket_famstdijt + β4 nomaxijt + β5 spec_std_coinsijt + β6 spec_std_copayijt + β7
prefbranddrugs_std_coinsijt + β8 prefbranddrugs_std_copay
ijt + β9 poor_or_fair_health
ijt +


β10 adult_smoking
ijt + β11 adult_obesity
ijt + β12 excess_drinking
ijt + β13 unemp_rate
ijt + β14




violent_crime_rateijt + β15 exp_death_cancer
ijt + β16 exp_death_heart
ijt + β17 numfirm
ijt +



β18 i.ntype
it + β19 i.year
ij + εijt


Model 3: The Effect of the Number of Plans and Firms per County on Premium Price
couplechild2_40ijt = β0 +
β1 meddeduct_famstdijt + β2 drugdeduct_famstdijt +
β3


medpocket_famstdijt + β4 nomaxijt + β5 spec_std_coinsijt + β6 spec_std_copayijt + β7
prefbranddrugs_std_coinsijt +
β8 prefbranddrugs_std_copay

ijt +
 β9 poor_or_fair_health
ijt +


β10 adult_smoking
ijt + β11 adult_obesity
ijt + β12 excess_drinking
ijt + β13 unemp_rate
ijt + β14




violent_crime_rateijt + β15 exp_death_cancer
ijt + β16 exp_death_heart
ijt + β17 numplan
ijt +



β18 numfirm
ijt + β19 i.ntype
it + β20 i.year
ij + εijt
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According to the literature, increased competition, which in my model is measured by the
number of plans and firms, reduces prices (Frank & McGuire, 2017). Therefore, I expect to find
that as the number of plans or the number of firms increases, the premium prices will fall.
6. Data Analysis & Visualization
After running the three models, I get the following listed in Table 6.1 below. Model 1 is the
model that includes the controls and only the number of plans per county. Model 2 is the model
that includes the controls and only the number of firms per county. Lastly, Model 3 is the model
that includes the controls and both the number of plans and firms per county.
Table 6.1 Regression Output for the Three Premium Models

The first piece of this analysis is to observe the effects that deductibles and out-of-pocket
maximums have on premium prices. In all three models, when the standard medical deductible
for family coverage increases holding all else constant, the premium decreases. For example,
according to Model 1, when the medical deductible increases by $100, the premium decreases by
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$1.03, holding all other factors constant. This makes economic sense, given that consumers are
responsible for a greater share of initial health costs, which saves the insurer money. Therefore,
the consumer sees lower monthly premiums (LaMontagne, 2014). Next, in all three models,
when the medical maximum out of pocket increases, we expect an increase in premiums holding
all else equal. From Model 2, if the medical maximum out of pocket increased $1000 and all else
stayed constant, we would expect premiums to increase $7.46. This may be contributable to
adverse selection in that if consumers demanded a plan with a higher maximum out of pocket,
then insurers may assume that the consumer expects to spend more money relative to the amount
of the maximum out of pocket expense. For many health insurance plans, there is no maximum
out of pocket. According to all three models, if there is no maximum out of pocket (nomax=1),
then we expect premiums to be lower. According to Model 3, if there is no maximum out of
pocket mechanism present, then premiums will be $95.39 lower, holding all else constant. This
follows economic sense because if consumers have no out of pocket limit, then they will have to
pay for a greater portion of total health expenses. Therefore, they pay lower premiums month to
month because insurers expect higher payments toward the end of the coverage period.
The second piece of this analysis looks at what effect coinsurance rates and copayments have on
monthly premiums. If the standard coinsurance for a visit with a specialist increases, holding all
else equal, we expect premiums to decrease. More specifically, if the coinsurance rate increases
ten percentage points, we would expect premiums to decline $5.63 cents each month holding all
else equal, according to Model 1. If the standard copayment for a specialist increases, i.e., $10 a
visit, then premiums will decrease over $3.00 a month holding all else equal, according to all
three models. Coinsurance and copayments on preferred brand drugs follow this same pattern.
This pattern makes economic sense in that, if the consumer is expected to pay a larger portion of
each visit or each prescription, the insurance can charge a lower premium per month.
The third piece of this analysis explores how health and socioeconomic factors correlate with
premiums. For all three models, in counties with higher rates of excess drinking, we expect
premiums to be higher. More specifically, according to Model if the rate of drinking increases
10%, then we expect the premiums in that county to be $11.92 higher, all else held equal. This
follows economic sense given the vast number of negative health risks excess drinking has on an
individual and his or her community. The unemployment rate has a positive relationship with the
premium price in all three models. According to the second model, if the unemployment rate
increased 10%, then the premiums would increase $68.28 monthly, all else held equal. This
follows the theory that unemployment would increase the uninsured rate or push people with no
income towards the individual market. A higher uninsured rate in a community negatively affects
those who are insured in that the cost burden of care for the uninsured falls on the insured
through higher premiums (Stoll & Bailey, 2009). The violent crime rate has a negative
relationship with premiums. This follows sound logic given that reduced violence also reduces
the need for and the total cost of emergency care, which allows insurers to shave down the price
of premiums. While the expected death rates from cancer and premiums have a negative
relationship, the expected death rate from heart disease has a positive relationship. These
relationships hold in each model. However, further investigation shows that there is a clear
multicollinearity problem between these two variables. Going forward, only one of the two
factors should be included.
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The fourth part of the analysis looks at the plan types and years. Compared to Exclusive Provider
Organizations (EPOs), Point of Service (POS) plans and Preferred Provider Organizations
(PPOs) are significantly more expensive in terms of premiums. This price increase is over $84
more for a POS and over $103 for a PPO across all three statistical models. As PPOs and POSs
have more flexibility than EPOs, higher premiums help pay for that freedom to see providers out
of the insurance network. Compared to the year 2014, each consecutive year is associated with
larger increases in premiums. This association deserves further examination since this could be
an omitted variable bias issue. This may be due to rising inflation, increased total healthcare
spending, or a policy instability issue that cause insurers to increase prices.
The final piece of the analysis looks at the two key variables of interest addressed in my research
question. In Model 1 and 3, I find that holding all else equal, the creation of one plan in a county
is associated with a $4.49 decrease and a $5.85 decrease in premiums respectively. In Model 2, I
find that holding all else equal, the entrance of one firm into a market is associated with a $9.71
decrease in premium prices. These findings follow the economic thought that more competition
puts downward pressure on price (Busso & Galiani, 2015). In Model 3, I find that holding all
else equal, which includes holding the number of plans equal, the addition of one firm into the
market is associated with an increase in the premium price of $12.10. Because the model holds
the number of plans equal, adding another firm would divide up the risk pool among more firms,
thus potentially decreasing each firm’s ability to mitigate risk through the pooling mechanisms.
7. Conclusion, Policy Recommendations, & Future Research
The goal of this research was to examine how the number of firms and the number of plans
offered in a county impact the premium price, after accounting for other components of a plan’s
price as well as health and socioeconomic factors of the county. This question is timely because
of the decreasing longevity of the Obamacare exchanges (Aaron, 2017) and the amount of
consolidation activity that may be affecting the competitiveness of the health insurance market
(Frank & McGuire, 2017). My findings show that an increase in the number of silver plans
offered on the exchanges for the 40 to 49-year-old couples with two children is associated with a
decrease in premium prices, holding all other factors constant. My findings also show that an
increase in the number of firms, holding all else but the number of plans equal, is associated with
a decrease in premium price. However, when accounting for the number of plans as well, an
increase in the number of firms leads to an increase in the premium price.
There are many implications of my findings. First of all, this shows that in the insurance markets
that look like monopolistic competition, firms may be using market power to raise prices more
often than they use economies of scale to pass cost-savings to consumers. To determine what
level insurance markets are sustainable and fair, the analysis is two-fold based on the number of
firms and the number of plans offered. Therefore, when thinking about how competitive a
marketplace is, it may be just as important for academics and policymakers to consider the
number of product or plan offerings in addition to the number of firms operating in a market.
This research supports the findings of Nickell (1996), Dafny (2015), Sheingold et al. (2015), and
Frank and McGuire (2017).
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Potential policy recommendations reflect what I have found. First, when looking at a potential
merger, the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justices should include the change in the
number of products or plans into their decision-making process. Next, some markets may never
attract enough insurers to encourage competition, so states should employ long-term active
purchasing arrangements with insurers to help create a sense of stability in the market (Frank &
McGuire, 2017)A similar option would be for Congress to authorize the federal government to
contract with private insurers to serve as last resort options in rating areas that were without
coverage (Aaron, 2017). Another policy recommendation would be to apply the carrier “play or
pay” mandate used in New Jersey. This would require insurance providers to sell their portion of
individual market policies or pay a fine that would help pay for the losses that other carriers
incurred. A play-or-pay option would also help keep counties at risk of having no providers stay
covered (Cantor & Monheit, 2016). The most expedient but also most unlikely recommendation
would be for Congress and the President to gather funds to reimburse insurers on the individual
market for cost-sharing reductions as owed and prevent further disruptive changes to ACA
(Aaron, 2017).
Much more research is necessary on the competitiveness of the US insurance markets. Building
off my research, one next step would be to broaden my analysis to insurance plans of different
metal levels, age groups, and family sizes to see if the associations between the factors and the
premium prices are similar. Another place for future research is to create an index similar to the
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) that incorporates the product offerings. One additional
research path for the future is to model how prices would have changed had the New Jersey
play-or-pay model had been implemented through ACA.

Patterson 20

Works Cited
Aaron, H., Fiedler, M., Ginsburg, P., Adler, L., & Rivlin, A. (2017). Turmoil in the individual
insurance market — Where it came from and how to fix it. The New England Journal of
Medicine, 377(4), 314-315.
Abelson, R. & Park, H. (2017, June 6). Obamacare didn’t destroy insurance markets, but it also
didn’t fix them. Retrieved from
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/06/06/health/insurance-market-before-and-aft
er-aca.html.
Abraham, J. M., Karaca-Mandic, P., & Simon, K. (2014). How has the Affordable Care Act’s
medical loss ratio regulation affected insurer behavior? Medical Care, 52(4), 370-377.
AllBusiness. (n.d.) The facts about PPO, HMO, FFS, and POS plans. Retrieved from
https://www.allbusiness.com/the-facts-about-ppo-hmo-ffs-and-pos-plans-770-1.html.
American Medical Association. (2017). Competition in health insurance research. Retrieved
from https://www.ama-assn.org/about/competition-health-insurance-research.
American Medical Association. (2016a). Markets where an Aetna-Humana merger warrants
antitrust scrutiny. Retrieved from
https://www.ama-assn.org/sites/default/files/media-browser/Competition-aetna-humanamerger-final.pdf.
American Medical Association. (2016b). Markets where an Anthem-Cigna merger warrants
antitrust scrutiny. Retrieved from
https://www.ama-assn.org/sites/default/files/media-browser/Competition-anthem-cignamerger-final.pdf
Barker, E. (2017, April). How consolidation is reshaping health care. Retrieved from
http://www.hfma.org/Leadership/E-Bulletins/2017/April/How_Consolidation_Is_Reshapi
ng_Health_Care/#Footnotes.
Benton, B. (2015, March 17). Building a strategy: Mergers and acquisitions in healthcare.
Retrieved from
https://www.dhgllp.com/resources/publications/article/967/building-a-strategy-mergers-a
cquisitions-in-healthcare.
Brenshan, T. & Reiss, P. (1991). Entry and competition in concentrated markets. Journal of
Political Economy, 99(5), 977-1009.
Busso, M. & Galiani, S. (2015, February). The causal effect of competition on prices and quality:
Evidence from a field experiment. Retrieved from

Patterson 21

https://www.povertyactionlab.org/sites/default/files/publications/811%20Competition-Pri
ces-Quality%20February%202015.pdf. Accessed on 26 January 2018.
Cantor, J., & Monheit, A. (2016). Reform of the individual insurance market in New Jersey:
Lessons for the Affordable Care Act. Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, 41(4),
871-801.
Cauchi, R. (2018, February). State actions to address health insurance exchanges. Retrieved
from
http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-actions-to-implement-the-health-benefit.aspx.
Accessed on 12 March 2018.
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (n.d.). Review of insurance rates. Retrieved on
from
https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Programs-and-Initiatives/Health-Insurance-Market-Reforms
/Review-of-Insurance-Rates.html.
Cision. (2016, March 24). Centene completes acquisition of Health Net. Retrieved from
https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/centene-completes-acquisition-of-health-net300241037.html. Accessed on 26 January 2018.
Clarke, T., Norris, T., & Schiller, J. (2017, May). Early release of selected estimates based on
data from the 2016 National Health Interview Survey. Retrieved from
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhis/earlyrelease/earlyrelease201705.pdf. Accessed on 26
January 2018.
County Health Rankings and Roadmaps (2018). Rankings data & documentation. Retrieved
from
http://www.countyhealthrankings.org/explore-health-rankings/rankings-data-documentati
on.
Congressional Budget Office. (2016, March). Federal subsidies for health insurance coverage
for people under age 65: Tables from CBO’s March 2016 baseline. Retrieved from
https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/recurringdata/51298-2016-03-healthinsurance.pdf.
Court, E. (2016, December 23). What is the individual health insurance market and why is
everyone so worried about it? Retrieved from
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/what-is-the-individual-market-and-why-is-everyone
-so-worried-about-it-2016-12-14.
Dafny, L. The Commonwealth Fund (2015, November 20). Evaluating the impact of health
insurance industry consolidation: learning from experience. Retrieved from
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/issue-briefs/2015/nov/evaluating-insura
nce-industry-consolidation.

Patterson 22

Dafny, L., Gruber, J., & Ody, C. (2014). More insurers lower premiums: Evidence from initial
pricing in the health insurance marketplaces. National Bureau of Economic Research,
20140.
Department of Justice. (2016, July 21). Justice Department and state attorneys general sue to
block Anthem’s acquisition of Cigna, Aetna’s acquisition of Humana. Retrieved from
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-and-state-attorneys-general-sue-blockanthem-s-acquisition-cigna-aetna-s. Accessed 26 January 2018.
Department of Justice. (2017, February 8). U.S. district court blocks Anthem’s acquisition of
Cigna. Retrieved from
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-district-court-blocks-anthem-s-acquisition-cigna.
Dickstein, M., Duggan, M., Orsini, J., & Tebaldi, P. (2015). The impact of market size and
composition on health insurance premiums: Evidence from the first year of the
Affordable Care Act. American Economic Review, 105(5), 120-125.
Eibner, C., & Saltzman, E. (2015). Assessing alternative modifications to the Affordable Care
Act: Impact on individual market premiums and insurance coverage. Rand Health
Quarterly, 4(4), 4.
Einav, L., & Levin, J. (2015). Managed competition in health insurance. Journal of the European
Economic Association, 13(6), 998-1021.
Frakt, A., Pizer, S., and Feldman, R. (2012). The effects of market structure and payment rate on
the entry of private health plans into the Medicare market. Inquiry, 49, 15-36.
Frank, R., & Mcguire, T. (2017). Regulated Medicare Advantage and Marketplace individual
health insurance markets rely on insurer competition. Health Affairs (Project Hope),
36(9), 1578-1584.
Fung, V., Liang, C., Donelan, K., Peitzman, C., Dow, W., Zaslavsky, A., . . . Hsu, J. (2017).
Nearly one-third of enrollees in California's individual market missed opportunities to
receive financial assistance. Health Affairs (Project Hope), 36(1), 21-31.
Ginsburg, Paul (2016, March 16). Health care market consolidations: Impacts on costs, quality,
and access. Retrieved from
https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/health-care-market-consolidations-impacts-on-co
sts-quality-and-access/#footnote-3. Accessed on 26 January 2018.
Glied, S., & Altman, S. (2017). Beyond antitrust: Health care and health insurance market
trends and the future of competition. Health Affairs (Project Hope), 36(9), 1572-1577.

Patterson 23

Guardado, J., Emmons, D., &, Kane, C. (2013). The price effects of a larger merger of health
insurers: A case study of UnitedHealth-Sierra. Health Management, Policy, and
Innovation, 1(3) 16-35.
Hollahan, J., Wengle, E., Blumberg, L., & Solleveld, P. (2017, January). What explains the 21%
increase in 2017 marketplace premiums? Retrieved from
https://www.rwjf.org/content/dam/farm/reports/issue_briefs/2017/rwjf433993.
Jaspen, B. (2017, March 1). AMA fears ‘political influence’ from Trump DOJ on Anthem-Cigna
deal. Retrieved from
https://www.forbes.com/forbes/welcome/?toURL=https://www.forbes.com/sites/brucejap
sen/2017/03/01/ama-fears-political-influence-from-trump-doj-on-anthem-cigna-merger/&
refURL=&referrer=#3be89f973e30.
Kaiser Family Foundation. (2016a). Market share and enrollment of largest three insurers –
individual market. Retrieved from
https://www.kff.org/private-insurance/state-indicator/market-share-and-enrollment-of-lar
gest-three-insurers-individual-market/?currentTimeframe=0&sortModel=%7B%22colId
%22:%22Location %22,%22sort%22:%22asc%22%7D#note..
Kaiser Family Foundation. (2016b, March 31). Marketplace enrollment by metal level. Retrieved
from
https://www.kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/marketplace-enrollment-by-metal-level/
?currentTimeframe=0&selectedDistributions=silver&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%2
2Location%22,%22sort%22:%22asc%22%7D.
Ladika, S. (2017, April 19). The new era of mega-plans. Retrieved from
https://www.managedcaremag.com/archives/2015/9/new-era-mega-plans.
LaMontagne, C. (2014, December 9). Should I choose a high or low deductible health insurance
plan? Retrieved from
https://www.forbes.com/sites/christinalamontagne/2014/12/09/should-i-choose-a-high-orlow-deductible-health-insurance-plan/#4335e40b64ef.
Luhby, T. (2017, May 9). Obamacare no longer on death’s door in Tennessee. Retrieved from
http://money.cnn.com/2017/05/09/news/economy/obamacare-knoxville-tennessee-bluecr
oss/index.html.
McGovern, C. (2013). Health insurance competition is anemic in most states, AMA study finds.
Idaho Business Review, Idaho Business Review, Dec 10, 2013.
National Center for Health Statistics. (2018). Potentially excess deaths from the five leading
causes of death. Retrieved from
https://catalog.data.gov/dataset/nchs-potentially-excess-deaths-from-the-five-leading-cau
ses-of-death.

Patterson 24

Newhouse, J. P. (1996). Free for all?: Lessons from the RAND health insurance experiment.
Cambridge (Massachusetts): Harvard University Press.
Nickell, S. J. (1996): “Competition and corporate performance”, Journal of Political Economy,
pp. 724-746.
Park, H. & Carlsen, A. (2017, June 9). For the first time, 45 counties could have no insurer in the
Obamacare marketplaces. Retrieved from
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/06/09/us/counties-with-one-or-no-obamacareinsurer.html.
Robeznieks, A. (2017, October 23). Health insurance markets are highly concentrated, new
report reveals. Retrieved from
https://wire.ama-assn.org/ama-news/health-insurance-markets-are-highly-concentrated-ne
w-report-reveals.
Ross, C. (2017, August 26). An Obamacare win: No ‘bare counties’ for health insurance next
year. Retrieved from
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/health/obamacare-win-bare-counties-health-insurance.
Sheingold, Steven. U.S Department of Health and Human Services. (2015, July 30). Competition
and choice in the health insurance marketplaces, 2014-2015: Impact on Premiums.
Retrieved from
https://aspe.hhs.gov/basic-report/competition-and-choice-health-insurance-marketplaces2014-2015-impact-premiums.
Stoll, K. and Bailey, K. (2009, May). Hidden health tax: Americans pay a premium. Retrieved
from http://familiesusa.org/product/hidden-health-tax-americans-pay-premium.
Swartz, K. and Garnick, D. (2000). Lessons from New Jersey. Journal of Health Politics, Policy,
and Law, 25(1), 45-70.
Tirole, J. (1988): The Theory of Industrial Organization: Jean Tirole, MIT press.
Trexler B. (2017, May 10). BlueCross BlueShield of Tennessee notifies state of intent to return to
Knoxville area Marketplace in 2018. Retrieved from
https://www.thedailytimes.com/news/bluecross-blueshield-of-tennessee-notifies-state-of-i
ntent-to-return/article_e6022fd8-d17a-511a-9d9a-79d9baef3ecb.html.
U.S. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (2017). QHP Landscape SHOP Medical
Market. Retrieved from
https://data.healthcare.gov/dataset/QHP-Landscape-SHOP-Market-Medical/ss3e-3mza.

Patterson 25

Vaida, B. & Wess, A. (2015, November). Health care consolidation. Retrieved from
http://www.allhealthpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Consolidation-Toolkit_169.p
df
Ziller, E., Coburn, A., McBride, T., & Andrews, C. (2004). Patterns of individual health
insurance coverage, 1996-2000. Health Affairs, 23(6), 210-21.

Patterson 26

Appendices
Appendix 1: Summary of Model

Patterson 27

Appendix 2: Model 1 Stata Output

Patterson 28

Appendix 3: Model 2 Stata Output

Patterson 29

Appendix 4: Model 3 Stata Output

